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Abstract 
A model is presented in which one firm borrows from one bank with a positive supply 
curve of loans. The bank monitors firm’s output, which firm produces output 
underground too, in order to avoid this monitoring and minimize its marginal 
expenditure on loans by defaulting. The model incorporates also a laborer-consumer 
who allocates labor between the formal and informal sectors in a way preserving full 
employment. In this model, the following results obtain: There cannot be underground 
only economy even in the absence of government national-accounting induced output 
monitoring once part at least of the output has to be monitored by the bank. The 
capital employed officially is always more than that underground. Bank monopoly 
power induces lexicographic preferences towards underground economy income. The 
stability of the system depends on the relative size of the official to total capital ratio 
and the response of loan demand to the interest rate. The introduction of government 
and indirect taxation alter the optimal official to total capital ratio. Yet, the steady-
state and stability of the system remain unchanged under a tax financed balanced 
budget. Government borrowing by a rent-seeking government or to cope with tax-
evasion induced budget deficits lowers lending to the firm and leads thereby the 
system to equilibrium away from steady-state; but tax evasion increases such lending 
towards steady-state restoration. 
Key Words: Developing economies, Concentrated banking, Bilateral monopsony, 
Underground economy, Taxation 
JEL Codes: O10, L10, E26, H20, D70  
1. Introduction 
According to La Porta and Shleifer (2008, p. 275): “In developing countries, informal 
firms account for up to about half of all economic activity. Using data from World 
Bank firm-level surveys, we find that informal firms are small and extremely 
unproductive compared with even the small formal firms in the sample, and especially 
relative to the larger formal firms.” Boly (2012) reports that most Less Developed 
Countries (LDCs, 32 out of 47) are located in sub-Saharan Africa, while 14 LDCs are 
located in Asia and  1 (Haiti) in Latin America  and  the  Caribbean, with low 
industrial base and significant market distortions that policymaking has to address.1 
Moreover, as Jebuni et al. (1988) note, domestic competition in developing economies 
is low and responsible for the inefficient use of resources. And, this is a picture of an 
economy with concentrated banking (see e.g. Demirguc-Kunt and Levine 1999, and 
Kemraj 2008). 
 
Can such a bank sector help development in Hirschman’s (1965) sense that 
development is not so much about finding optimal combinations of productive factors 
and resources as on using—for development tasks—resources and capabilities that are 
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hidden, scattered, or badly utilized? Researchers have found considerable evidence 
that banking system structure affects official and unofficial output growth. For 
example, according to Mitchener and Wheelock (2010, Abstract), “banking market 
concentration had a positive impact on manufacturing sector growth in the early 
twentieth century”. Cetorelli and Gambera (2001) and Hoxha (2009) add that bank 
industry concentration boosts also the growth of industries that depend relatively 
heavily on non-bank financing. And, judging from Capasso and Jappelli’s (2013) 
claim that non-bank finance is channeled to low-return technology underground, one 
concludes that increased bank market power corroborates growth in the formal sector 
of the economy directly and in the informal sector indirectly.  
 
Under these circumstances of small and mainly informal firms and a few official 
corporate conglomerates, an investigation of the developmental role of banking in 
LDCs might be pursued analytically within the context of a bilateral monopsony for 
loans as follows: People live long enough to try increase and smooth income and 
consumption during their lifetime through the development of two key economic 
institutions, namely banks and firms. Consider a hypothetical economy in which this 
aim is pursued as follows: (i) People deposit money with the bank that they have 
established in order to benefit from the deposit rate and from a share in the profits 
accompanying the operation of the bank as a lender to the firm, (ii) which people too, 
have incorporated to complete the whole scheme of enhancing income and smoothing 
consumption over time.  
 
The primary institution in this scheme is the bank and this is the reason why people let 
it have “the upper hand” by letting it exercise monopoly power through a supply 
curve of loans according to which the lending rate includes a premium for alleged 
default. People defend against this bank behavior by allowing firms to actually default 
by hiding information to the lending bank that the firm will invest to produce and sell 
output underground hidden from the bank2. That is, the empirical evidence about 
increased demand for non-bank finance under concentrated banking is modeled here 
as demand for bank loans that will not be paid out. The two concepts of loan demand 
become equivalent analytically, when by the term “the bank” is meant the overall 
financial system.3 So “the bank” does well contemplating some probability of default. 
People tolerate this weakness of the system, because any income generated by banks 
and firms is ultimately distributed among them… 
 
The next section works out the analytics of such a bank-firm bilateral monopsony 
scenario.4 Assuming away wage differences and trade between formal and informal 
sectors on which the dual economy literature focuses (see e.g. Bhattacharya 1994), the 
aim is to derive the optimal official to total capital ratio under the presumption that 
both parties agree with the market clearing price-quantity. This presumption is made 
for comparison purposes with the outcome under a social-welfare minded 
government, taxing to finance its role as a regulatory agency aiming at enforcing the 
market clearing price-quantity. A comparison with the outcome under a rent-seeking 
bureaucracy favoring the high price-low quantity option to benefit by selling bonds in 
exchange of the subsequent excess bank liquidity, is made, too. This case is illustrated 
diagrammatically at the end of the next section when a third type of government, 
namely the populist rent-seeking bureaucracy in support of the low price-low quantity 
combination, is examined briefly, too.  
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It is clear that the approach to development underlying the discussion herein focuses 
not on development per se but on how it is shaped based on overt and covert 
resources and capabilities financed by concentrated banking. Neither the model 
elaborated below is a dynamic aggregate growth model; it is one based on some 
microeconomics upon which the initial conditions of a dynamic analysis may be 
formed.  The third section should be one checking the real-world relevance of the 
results but several restrictive assumptions have been made like the neglect of the 
international factor which plays a major role in LDCs. International trade and foreign 
direct investment should be encouraging the official economy at the expense of the 
unofficial one. But, government borrowing from abroad is expected to be sooner or 
later recessionary if the money is not channeled to public investment. And, what 
about the complications arising from link between international profit shifting and tax 
evasion? The third section concludes this paper by contemplating on such issues and 
on its restrictive assumptions in general. 
 
2. The Formal Discussion 
Under the socioeconomic arrangement described earlier, there is an underground 
economy which is initially identified with the sector of the economy where output 
comes out of the capital formed on the basis of default loans. Tax evasion becomes 
one more reason to go underground when government and taxation are introduced 
into the discussion. 
2.1 The Basic Model 
According to La Porta and Shleifer (2008, p. 275): “Few formal firms have ever 
operated informally”. So, in what follows, the allocation of business operations 
between formal and informal activities is taken to be that of the private business 
sector in its entirety. More precisely, let: 
ℎ =
𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙
=
𝐾
𝐻 + 𝐾
 
where 𝐾 is the capital employed officially while 𝐻 is the capital used underground. 
Following Bonaccorsi di Patti and Dell’Ariccia (2004) who document that banking 
market concentration promotes firm creation in industries where the creditworthiness 
of entrepreneurs is difficult to assess, and identifying these industries as those that are 
prone to underground operations, the difference: 
1 − ℎ =
𝐻
𝐻 + 𝐾
≡ 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡 
in so far as lending to the whole private sector is concerned. Firms can influence the 
cost of funding by deciding which part of their assets will disclose and pledge them as 
collateral. And, as Hart (1995) argues, a debt in firm’s capital structure can mutually 
benefit debtor and creditor if contracts are incomplete. Anyway, in this basic model 
the only reason to allocate investment underground is to default in a Capasso and 
Jappelli (2013) fashion. Hence, ℎ = 1 − (1 − ℎ), and the profit of the lending bank, 
𝛱𝐵, may be written as follows: 
𝛱𝐵 = ℎ𝑟𝐿 − 𝛿𝐷 − 𝑐(𝐿)       (1) 
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where 𝑟 is the lending rate, 𝛿 is the deposit rate, 𝐿 and 𝐷 is loans and deposits 
respectively, while 𝑐(𝐿) is the operational cost of lending. If 𝜌 is the reserve 
requirements ratio: 
𝜌𝐷 + 𝐿 = 𝐷 ⇒ 𝐷 =
𝐿
1 − 𝜌
       (2) 
Given this and that the inverse demand for loans in an LDC (see e.g. Kemraj 2008) is: 
𝑟 = 𝑎 − 𝑏𝐿      (3) 
(1) becomes: 
𝛱𝐵 = ℎ(𝑎 − 𝑏𝐿)𝐿 −
𝛿
1 − 𝜌
𝐿 − 𝑐(𝐿)       (1′) 
where 𝑎 and 𝑏 are some positive constants. The first order condition for profit 
maximization in 𝐿 is: 
𝑑𝛱𝐵
𝑑𝐿
= ℎ𝑎 − 2ℎ𝑏𝐿 −
𝛿
1 − 𝜌
− 𝑐′ = 0 ⇒ 
𝐿∗ =
(1 − 𝜌)(ℎ𝑎 − 𝑐′) − 𝛿
2ℎ𝑏(1 − 𝜌)
       (4) 
where 𝑐′ is the marginal cost of loan supply. Inserting (3) in the same condition, one 
obtains that at the optimum: 
𝑟∗ =
𝛿 + (1 − 𝜌)𝑐′
ℎ(1 − 𝜌)
+ 𝑏𝐿∗     (5) 
which in view of (4) gives an: 
𝑟∗ =
𝛿 + (1 − 𝜌)(ℎ𝑎 + 𝑐′)
2ℎ(1 − 𝜌)
      (5′) 
Setting ℎ = 0 in (4) and (5′), both 𝐿∗ and 𝑟∗ become infinity: There cannot be 
underground only economy. This is a result which obtains wholly within the context 
of the private sector, i.e. in the absence of a government that would require output 
reporting for national account at least purposes. It is the lending bank that requires so.  
Next, the bank and the firm form a bilateral monopsony in 𝐿. It is assumed that they 
have agreed upon the market clearing 𝑟, ?̃?, by equating it with 𝑟∗below and by having 
the firm taking 𝑟∗ = ?̃? for granted. That is, if the revenue of the borrowing firm from 
the sale of its product(s) is 𝑅 = 𝑚𝐿𝑒, with 0 < 𝑒 ≤ 1, the firm’s task is to choose that 
ℎ  which maximizes its profit: 
𝛱𝐹 = 𝑚(𝐿
∗)𝑒 − 𝑟∗𝐿∗      (6) 
The first order condition yields that: 
𝑑𝛱𝐹
𝑑ℎ
=
𝑚𝑒[𝛿 + (1 − 𝜌)𝑐′]
2ℎ2𝑏(1 − 𝜌)
[
2ℎ𝑏(1 − 𝜌)
(1 − 𝜌)(ℎ𝑎 − 𝑐′) − 𝛿
]
1−𝑒
−
[𝛿 + (1 − 𝜌)𝑐′]2
8ℎ3𝑏(1 − 𝜌)2
= 0 
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or the same, the following cubic equation in ℎ: 
ℎ3[32𝑏(𝑚𝑒)2(1 − 𝜌)2] − ℎ{[𝛿 + (1 − 𝜌)𝑐′]2(1 − 𝜌)𝑎} + [𝛿 + (1 − 𝜌)𝑐′]3 = 0 
when for convenience 𝑒 = 1/2. The discriminant is clearly negative and hence, the 
equation has one real root and two nonreal complex conjugate roots. The real one is:  
ℎ∗ = √
3𝛷∗ + √9𝛷∗2 + 4𝛹∗3
6
3
− √
−3𝛷 + √9𝛷∗2 + 4𝛹∗3
6
3
     (7) 
where 𝛷∗ = {[𝛿 + (1 − 𝜌)𝑐′]2(1 − 𝜌)𝑎} [32𝑏(𝑚𝑒)2(1 − 𝜌)2]⁄  and 𝛹∗ =
[𝛿 + (1 − 𝜌)𝑐′]3 [32𝑏(𝑚𝑒)2(1 − 𝜌)2]⁄ . It may be easily checked that this root is 
positive and less than one. We also obtain that: 
𝐾∗ =
√3𝛷∗ + √9𝛷∗2 + 4𝛹∗3
3
− √−3𝛷 + √9𝛷∗2 + 4𝛹∗3
3
√6
3
− √3𝛷∗ + √9𝛷∗2 + 4𝛹∗3
3
+ √−3𝛷 + √9𝛷∗2 + 4𝛹∗3
3
𝐻∗   (8) 
The fraction in (8) exceeds one, and the capital employed officially is always more 
than that underground, when the numerator exceeds the denominator or the same, if: 
2√3𝛷∗ + √9𝛷∗2 + 4𝛹∗3
3
> √6
3
+ (2)√−3𝛷 + √9𝛷∗2 + 4𝛹∗3
3
 
According to to Buehn and Schneider (2011), this is the rule in the real world, 
indeed.5 Now, recall that the firm and the bank form a bilateral monopsony in 𝐿, 
having agreed upon the market clearing 𝑟, ?̃?, and so:  
𝛱𝐵 = ℎ?̃?𝐿 −
𝛿
1 − 𝜌
𝐿 − 𝑐(𝐿) 
and consequently, 
𝑑𝛱𝐵
𝑑𝐿
= ℎ?̃? −
𝛿
1 − 𝜌
− 𝑐′ = 0 ⇒ ?̃? =
𝛿 + (1 − 𝜌)𝑐′
ℎ(1 − 𝜌)
 
It follows that (5) and (5′) are equivalent to: 
𝑟∗ = ?̃? + 𝑏𝐿∗    (9)        𝑎𝑛𝑑         𝑟∗ = (?̃? + 𝑎) 2⁄         (9′) 
respectively. Combining (9) with a supply curve of loans according to which the 
lending rate includes a mark-up offsetting the probability of default to discourage 
underground activities: 
𝑟 = ?̃? + (1 − ℎ)𝐿       (10) 
one concludes that 𝑏 = 1 − ℎ. Combining next (10) with (3) yields that: 
𝑟 =
?̃?𝑏 + 𝑎(1 − ℎ)
𝑏 + (1 − ℎ)
 
or when 𝑏 = 1 − ℎ: 
6 
 
𝑟 =
(?̃? + 𝑎)𝑏
2𝑏
= 𝑟∗ 
That is, if, for example, a Liapunov function in𝑏 ≠ 1 − ℎ was defined regarding the 
dynamics of 𝐾 and 𝐻, the equality between 𝑏 and 1 − ℎ would emerge as a globally 
asymptotically stable equilibrium. And, (8) could be simplified to read: 
𝐾∗
𝐻∗ + 𝐾∗
= 1 − 𝑏 ⇒ 𝐾∗ =
1 − 𝑏
𝑏
𝐻∗      (8′) 
From (8), 1 − 𝑏 should exceed 𝑏, implying along with 1 − 𝑏 > 0 that 0 < 𝑏 < 1 2⁄ . 
This in conjunction with the derivative 𝑑𝐿 𝑑𝑟⁄ = − 1 𝑏⁄  from (3), lead to the 
conclusion that: The demand for loans is highly sensitive to lending rate changes. Or, 
that the penalty of the mark-up (1 − ℎ)𝐿 affects greatly the amount and purpose of 
borrowing and thereby the volume of investment in both formal and informal sectors. 
The output of these sectors, 𝑌 and 𝑉, respectively, could be taken to derive from the 
production functions: 
𝑌 = 𝛽 (
𝑛𝑁
𝐾∗
)
𝛾
      (11) 
for the formal sector, and: 
𝑉 = 𝜗 [
(1 − 𝑛)𝑁
𝐻∗
]
𝜇
       (12) 
for the underground economy, where 𝑁 is total labor supply, 𝑛 is the fraction of labor 
in the official economy, and 𝛽, 𝜗, 𝛾 and 𝜇 are some positive constants, with 0 ≤
𝛾, 𝜇 < 1. On the part of labor, its supply is fully inelastic at its full over the total 
economy employment level, 𝑁∗, capable of being channeled across sectors without 
frictions so as to be keeping consumption, 𝑐, at its equilibrium level, 𝑐∗. Optimal 
consumption derives from the maximization of the utility function: 𝑈 = 𝜁𝑐𝜎, which in 
view of the budget constraint: 𝑐 = 𝑌 + 𝑉 + 𝛥, becomes: 
𝑈 = 𝜁(𝑌 + 𝑉 + 𝛥)𝜎 ⇒ 𝑈 = 𝜁 {𝛽 (
𝑛𝑁∗
𝐾∗
)
𝛾
+ 𝜗 [
(1 − 𝑛)𝑁∗
𝐻∗
]
𝜇
+ 𝛥}
𝜎
     (13) 
where 𝜁 and 𝜎 is some positive constants, with 0 < 𝜎 < 1. The symbol 𝛥 designates 
“other income”, that is (1 + 𝛿)𝐷 plus shares in the profits of banks and firms. (13) 
reflects the identity of preferences over consumption and income, postulated by the 
scenario describing our hypothetical economy. The purpose of labor is how to allocate 
labor between formal and informal activities so as 𝑐∗ may be attained given 𝐾∗ and 
𝐻∗ and hence, 𝛥 does not enter into the relevant calculations: 
𝑑𝑈
𝑑𝑛
= 𝜁𝜎𝑐𝜎−1 [
𝛽𝛾(𝑁∗)𝛾𝑛𝛾−1
(𝐾∗)𝛾
−
𝜗𝜇(𝑁∗)𝜇
(𝐻∗)𝜇
] = 0 ⇒ 
𝑛∗ = (
𝜗𝜇
𝛽𝛾
)
1
𝛾−𝜇 1
𝑁∗
𝐾∗
𝛾
𝛾−𝜇
𝐻∗
𝜇
𝛾−𝜇
        (14) 
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or, in view of (8′), 
𝑛∗ = (
𝜗𝜇
𝛽𝛾
)
1
𝛾−𝜇
(
1 − 𝑏
𝑏
)
𝜇
𝛾−𝜇 𝐾∗
𝑁∗
       (14′) 
From (14), 
𝑑𝑛∗
𝑑𝐾∗
= (
𝜗𝜇
𝛽𝛾
)
1
𝛾−𝜇 1
𝑁∗
(
𝛾
𝛾 − 𝜇
) (
𝐾∗
𝐻∗
)
𝜇
𝛾−𝜇
 
while from (14′), 
𝑑𝑛∗
𝑑𝐾∗
= (
𝜗𝜇
𝛽𝛾
)
1
𝛾−𝜇 1
𝑁∗
(
1 − 𝑏
𝑏
)
𝜇
𝛾−𝜇
 
It follows from these two last derivatives that: 
(
𝛾
𝛾 − 𝜇
) (
𝐾∗
𝐻∗
)
𝜇
𝛾−𝜇
= (
1 − 𝑏
𝑏
)
𝜇
𝛾−𝜇
⇒ (
𝛾
𝛾 − 𝜇
)
𝛾−𝜇
𝜇 𝐾∗
𝐻∗
= (
1 − 𝑏
𝑏
) 
which in conjunction with (8′) yields that: 
(
𝛾
𝛾 − 𝜇
)
𝛾−𝜇
𝜇 𝐾∗
𝐻∗
=
𝐾∗
𝐻∗
⇒ 𝜇 = 0 
That is, utility is maximized when 𝑉 = 𝜗: Once 𝐻 is determined by the bank-firm 
interaction at 𝐻∗, labor sets 𝑛 so as to maximize the utility from the output based on 
𝐾∗. Bank monopoly power induces lexicographic preferences towards underground 
economy income. The meaning of lexicographic preferences is that what matters for 
utility maximization is the overall consumption from formal and informal activities 
regardless any preferences favoring consumption from one of them (see e.g. Whalley, 
and Zhang 2011). It is a sociological phenomenon documented by anthropological 
investigation, and it obtains here as a result of “orthodox” modeling, because of the 
assumption that the informal sector is an inescapable feature of any economy.6 It 
does, however, explain why value added, productivity and quality, are low in this 
economy (see e.g. La Porta and Shleifer 2008). 
2.2 The Introduction of Government 
So far we have assumed a private only sector economy; no government and hence, 
taxes to finance its expenditures, and no central bank to issue money beyond the bank 
money which has been assumed implicitly until now. Let us know introduce a public 
sector in which the role of the government is a regulatory-agency one instituted to 
safeguard against the emergence of bilateral monopsony bargaining away from ?̃?. A 
too high lending rate would deter loan demand on the part of the firm, and a too low 
rate would undermine the profitability of lending on the part of the bank. Either case 
is highly likely as a solution to bilateral monopsony bargaining, investment of any 
kind would be hurt and unborrowed free reserves would pile up. The task of the 
government is to prevent the outgrowth of such trends through regulation, financing it 
through taxes.  
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Financing government intervention by selling bonds to the bank would prompt the 
bank to adopt bilateral monopsony bargaining practices in order to produce those 
unborrowed by the firm reserves that would be channeled to the government. The 
government rivals the private sector for bank funds, strengthening the bargaining 
power of the bank against the firm, and cancelling thereby its raison d'être as a social-
welfare maximizing institution set out to control the bank. One reason why such a 
rivalry might come up is an income redistribution scheme at the expense of the people 
and benefiting (i) the banker itself by exploiting its monopoly position, and (ii) a rent-
seeking bureaucracy, accommodating the banker’s own interests by selling bonds to 
the bank that will never be redeemed.  
In what follows, we examine the effects of both kinds of government, and by noting 
that it is a standard proposition of public finance theory that a firm and/or bank profit 
tax would not alter decisionmaking, ceteris paribus, that is, given the type of 
government. Either tax might be seen as the part of profit that goes to the government 
when profits are distributed to agents (i) under a balanced government budget in the 
case of the social-welfare maximizing government, and (ii) over and above the profit 
extracted by an exploiting banker and rent-seeking bureaucracy. Also, it is seen below 
that the connection of labor’s choice with a personal income tax is not critical in 
influencing the stability of the system. So the focus of the discussion should be the 
indirect taxation under each type of government as follows. 
Let us start with a social-welfare minded government whose expenditure 𝐺 is wholly 
financed by ad valorem taxation on the bank at a rate 𝜏 and on the firm at a rate 𝑡. (4) 
and (5′) become: 
?̅? =
(1 − 𝜌)(ℎ𝑎𝜏 − 𝑐′) − 𝛿
2ℎ𝑏𝜏(1 − 𝜌)
       (15) 
?̅? =
𝛿 + (1 − 𝜌)(ℎ𝑎𝜏 + 𝑐′)
2ℎ𝜏(1 − 𝜌)
      (16) 
respectively, with ?̅? < 𝐿∗ ⇒ −(1 − 𝜌)𝑐′ < 𝛿, which is true, and with ?̅? > 𝑟∗ ⇒
(1 − 𝜌)𝑐′ > −𝛿. In so far as the firm is concerned, (6) becomes: 
𝛱𝐹 = 𝑡𝑚(?̅?)
𝑒 − ?̅??̅?      (17) 
with 
𝑑𝛱𝐹
𝑑ℎ
=
𝑡𝑚𝑒[𝛿 + (1 − 𝜌)𝑐′]
2ℎ2𝑏𝜏(1 − 𝜌)
[
2ℎ𝑏𝑡(1 − 𝜌)
(1 − 𝜌)(ℎ𝑎𝜏 − 𝑐′) − 𝛿
]
1−𝑒
−
[𝛿 + (1 − 𝜌)𝑐′]2
8ℎ3𝑏(1 − 𝜌)2
= 0 
or the same, the following cubic equation in ℎ, assuming of course again that 𝑒 = 1/
2: 
ℎ3[32𝑏(𝑚𝑒)2(1 − 𝜌)2𝑡3] − ℎ{[𝛿 + (1 − 𝜌)𝑐′]2(1 − 𝜌)𝑎𝑡𝜏2} + 𝜏2[𝛿 + (1 − 𝜌)𝑐′]3
= 0 
with only one real solution: 
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ℎ̅ = √
3?̅? + √9?̅?2 + 4?̅?3
6
3
− √
−3?̅? + √9?̅?2 + 4?̅?3
6
3
     (18) 
where ?̅? = {[𝛿 + (1 − 𝜌)𝑐′]2(1 − 𝜌)𝑎𝑡𝜏2} [32𝑏(𝑚𝑒)2(1 − 𝜌)2𝑡3]⁄  and ?̅? =
𝜏2[𝛿 + (1 − 𝜌)𝑐′]3 [32𝑏(𝑚𝑒)2(1 − 𝜌)2𝑡3]⁄ . Comparing 𝛷∗ with ?̅?, the two become 
equal when 𝑡 = 𝜏, in which case 𝛹∗ > ?̅?; but,  
𝜕ℎ 𝜕𝛹 =⁄ 12(6−4/3)𝛹2(9𝛷2 + 4𝛹3)−1/2 {[3𝛷 + (9𝛷2 + 4𝛹3)1/2]
−2/3
− [−3𝛷 + (9𝛷2 + 4𝛹3)1/2]
−2/3
} > 0 
and hence, ℎ̅ < ℎ∗. That is, all depends on the relationship between the two tax rates. 
Taxation will raise 𝐾 for sure, or ℎ̅ > ℎ∗, if 𝜏2 > 𝑡3 so that both ?̅? > 𝛹∗ and ?̅? > 𝛷∗ 
given that: 
𝜕ℎ 𝜕𝛷 =⁄
[3 + 9𝛷(9𝛷2 + 4𝛹3)−1/2][3𝛷 + 9(9𝛷2 + 4𝛹3)1/2]
−2/3
3(6)1/3
−
[−3 + 9𝛷(9𝛷2 + 4𝛹3)−1/2][−3𝛷 + 9(9𝛷2 + 4𝛹3)1/2]
−2/3
3(6)1/3
> 0 
In any case, the introduction of government alters the optimal ℎ. But, recall that its 
purpose is to be keeping 𝑟 at ?̃?, and this is managed as follows. 
𝛱𝐵 = ℎ?̃?𝜏𝐿 −
𝛿
1 − 𝜌
𝐿 − 𝑐(𝐿) 
and consequently, 
𝑑𝛱𝐵
𝑑𝐿
= ℎ?̃?𝜏 −
𝛿
1 − 𝜌
− 𝑐′ = 0 ⇒ ?̃? =
𝛿 + (1 − 𝜌)𝑐′
ℎ𝜏(1 − 𝜌)
 
Equating this ?̃? with (16) yields that: 
𝜏̅ =
𝛿 + (1 − 𝜌)𝑐′
ℎ𝑎(1 − 𝜌)
     (19) 
The government can keep 𝑟 at ?̃? by setting this tax rate, 𝜏̅, for the bank. And, the 
relationship in general between ?̅? and ?̃? is a replication of (9′): 
?̅? = (?̃? + 𝑎) 2⁄         (9′′) 
Combining, next, (3) with (15) yields that ?̅? = ?̃? + 𝑏?̅?, which when in turn is 
combined with the supply curve of loans: 𝑟 = ?̃? + (1 − ℎ), the conclusion that 𝑏 =
1 − ℎ and that this equality is a globally asymptotically stable equilibrium continues 
to hold. The introduction of social-welfare minded government and indirect taxation 
does not influence the stability of the system. It is easily checked that in so far as the 
consumer-laborer is concerned, 𝑛 would be affected but nothing else as it should be 
indeed the case under lexicographic preferences towards the informal sector. Equally 
easily may be verified that these preferences and the assumption of full employment 
suggest that neither the introduction of personal income taxation at some rate 𝕥 would 
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alter the stability of the system beyond a further change in 𝑛.7 These are conclusions 
under a social welfare minded government: 𝐺 = (𝜏 + 𝑡)𝐿. Or, under personal income 
taxation: 𝐺 = (𝜏 + 𝑡)𝐿 + 𝕥(𝑌 + 𝑉), in the absence, of course, of tax evasion that 
would prompt one consider 𝑉 to be untaxed.  
Things under a rent-seeking bureaucracy will be different if, assuming for simplicity 
away 𝕥, 𝐺 = (𝜏 + 𝑡)𝐿 + 𝜆𝐷 as follows: If 𝜆 is the fraction of 𝐷 channeled by the bank 
to bond purchases, (2) becomes: 
𝐷 =
𝐿
1 − 𝜌 − 𝜆
      (2′) 
with (1 − 𝜌) in (4) and (5′) being replaced by (1 − 𝜌 − 𝜆) in (15) and (16): 
?̂? =
(1 − 𝜌 − 𝜆)(ℎ𝑎𝜏 − 𝑐′) − 𝛿
2ℎ𝑏𝜏(1 − 𝜌 − 𝜆)
       (20) 
?̂? =
𝛿 + (1 − 𝜌 − 𝜆)(ℎ𝑎𝜏 + 𝑐′)
2ℎ𝜏(1 − 𝜌 − 𝜆)
      (21) 
To compare ?̂? and  ?̅?, and  ?̂? with ?̅?, we need to know which is the relative size of the 
𝜏 involved in each expression. And, this may be found by asking which is the bank 
tax rate needed to ensure that ?̂? = ?̃? if this type of government wanted so. It is the 
rate: 
?̂? =
𝛿 + (1 − 𝜌 − 𝜆)𝑐′
ℎ𝑎(1 − 𝜌 − 𝜆)
> 𝜏̅     (19′) 
because ?̂? > 𝜏̅ ⇒ 0 > −ℎ𝑎𝛿𝜆, which is true. The difference, ?̂? − 𝜏̅ = ℎ𝑎𝛿𝜆, is what is 
appropriated by the bank in exchange of 𝜆𝐷; it is a bank profit which is not 
distributed to the people, in exchange of the rent 𝜆𝐷 accruing to bureaucracy. 
In so far as the firm is concerned, it has no other option but to act as a Stackelberg 
follower, setting subsequently: 
ℎ̂ = √
3?̂? + √9?̂?2 + 4?̂?3
6
3
− √
−3?̂? + √9?̂?2 + 4?̂?3
6
3
     (22) 
where ?̂? = {[𝛿 + (1 − 𝜌 − 𝜆)𝑐′]2(1 − 𝜌 − 𝜆)𝑎𝑡𝜏2} [32𝑏(𝑚𝑒)2(1 − 𝜌 − 𝜆)2𝑡3]⁄  and 
?̂? = 𝜏2[𝛿 + (1 − 𝜌 − 𝜆)𝑐′]3 [32𝑏(𝑚𝑒)2(1 − 𝜌 − 𝜆)2𝑡3]⁄ . In view of (19′), ?̂? > ?̅? 
and ?̂? > ?̅? given 𝑡. And, since ℎ is increasing in both 𝛷 and 𝛹, one concludes that 
ℎ̂ > ℎ̅: The reduction of loanable funds brought about by government lending is in 
line with Fielding (2007). It appears to be discouraging firms from operating 
underground to lower the probability of default and benefit thereby as much as they 
can from the limited funds. And, again, no change in consumer behavior is expected 
other than adjusting 𝑛. But, once (19′) holds, 𝑏 ceases to be equal to 1 − ℎ, and the 
system is forced to operate at an equilibrium away from the steady-state one.8 
2.3 The Introduction of Tax Evasion 
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Taxation may induce the bank and the firm to tax evade. In our one bank-one firm-
one person scenario, tax evasion does not make sense as all of these entities could be 
monitored by the government continuously. These entities are rather averages of a 
multitude of banks-firms-persons, respectively, differing only in tax compliance 
attitude. The tax evasion probabilities corresponding to banks and firms are 𝑝 and 𝑞, 
respectively, and are the probabilities of tax audit. To keep calculations as simple as 
possible, penalties for tax evasion are assumed away. Under these circumstances, 
government borrowing becomes inevitable even for the social-welfare minded 
government. Thus, for the bank: 
𝛱𝐵 = (1 − 𝑝)ℎ(𝑎 − 𝑏𝐿)𝐿 + 𝑝𝜏ℎ(𝑎 − 𝑏𝐿)𝐿 −
𝛿
1 − 𝜌 − 𝜆
𝐿 − 𝑐(𝐿) 
?́? =
(1 − 𝜌 − 𝜆)(ℎ𝑎𝑃 − 𝑐′) − 𝛿
2ℎ𝑏𝑃(1 − 𝜌 − 𝜆)
       (23) 
?́? =
𝛿 + (1 − 𝜌 − 𝜆)(ℎ𝑎𝑃 + 𝑐′)
2ℎ𝑃(1 − 𝜌 − 𝜆)
       (24) 
where 𝑃 = [(1 − 𝑝) + 𝑝𝜏] > 𝜏 provided that 1 > 𝜏. Similarly, for the firm: 
𝛱𝐹 = (1 − 𝑞)𝑚(?́?)
𝑒 + 𝑞𝑡𝑚(?́?)
𝑒
− ?́??́? 
with first order condition under 𝑒 = 1 2⁄ : 
𝑑𝛱𝐹
𝑑ℎ
=
𝑞𝑡𝑚𝑎[ℎ𝑏(1 − 𝜌 − 𝜆)𝐾] − 𝑞𝑡𝑚𝑏{(1 − 𝜌 − 𝜆)[ℎ𝑎𝐾 − 𝑐′] − 𝛿}
2ℎ𝑏√2ℎ𝑏(1 − 𝜌 − 𝜆)𝑃{(1 − 𝜌)[ℎ𝑎𝑃 − 𝑐′] − 𝛿}
−
𝛿(1 − 𝜌 − 𝜆)2[𝛿 + (1 − 𝜌 − 𝜆)𝑐′]2 + 𝑐′2
2ℎ3(1 − 𝜌 − 𝜆)4𝑏𝑃2
= 0 
from which the following value of ℎ obtains: 
ℎ́ = √
3?́? + √9?́?2 + 4?́?3
6
3
− √
−3?́? + √9?́?2 + 4?́?3
6
3
     (25) 
where  
?́? =
 2𝑎{𝛿(1 − 𝜌 − 𝜆)2[𝛿 + (1 − 𝜌 − 𝜆)𝑐′]2 + 𝑐′2}2
𝑏{𝑞𝑚𝑡[𝛿 + (1 − 𝜌 − 𝜆)𝑐′]}2(1 − 𝜌 − 𝜆)4𝑃2
 
and 
?́? =
2(1 − 𝜌 − 𝜆){𝛿(1 − 𝜌 − 𝜆)2[𝛿 + (1 − 𝜌 − 𝜆)𝑐′]2 + 𝑐′2}2
𝑏[𝛿 + (1 − 𝜌 − 𝜆)𝑐′][𝑞𝑚𝑡(1 − 𝜌 − 𝜆)4]2𝑃3
 
Both, ?́? and ?́? decrease in 𝑃 and hence, in 𝜏, given that 𝑃 appears only in the 
denominator of ?́? and ?́?. This, in turn, implies that the introduction of 𝜏 reduces ℎ 
when tax evasion is allowed given the direct relationship between ℎ and 𝛷 and 𝛹. 
The same is true with regard to 𝑡 as it too appears only in the denominator. Intuitively, 
this decline in ℎ in response to tax evasion is something that should be expected, 
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indeed. By escaping taxes, banks lend more at a lower interest rate vis a vis what (20) 
and (21) indicate: ?̂? < ?́? ⇒ 2ℎ𝑏(1 − 𝜌 − 𝜆)(1 − 𝑝)[𝛿 + (1 − 𝜌 − 𝜆)𝑐′](𝜏 − 1) < 0, 
which is true; and ?́? < ?̂? ⇒ 2ℎ(1 − 𝜌 − 𝜆)(1 − 𝑝)[𝛿 + (1 − 𝜌 − 𝜆)𝑐′](𝜏 − 1) < 0, 
which is also true. And, in order to escape taxes, firms increase underground 
investment.9 
The case of the social-welfare minded government is that for which 𝜆 is equal to zero. 
This type of government could ensure that ?́? = ?̃? by setting: 
?́? =
(1 − 2𝑝)[𝛿 + (1 − 𝜌)𝑐′] − (1 − 𝜌)(1 − 𝑝)ℎ𝑎
𝑝(1 − 𝜌)ℎ𝑎 − 2𝑝[𝛿 + (1 − 𝜌)𝑐′]
 
To specify what is meant by 𝜆 = 0 under such a government, note that the part of 
government borrowing that goes to balance the budget can be identified through the 
relationship: 𝐺 = (𝑝𝜏 + 𝑞𝑡)𝐿 + 𝑠𝐷 = (𝜏 + 𝑡)𝐿, from which, in view of (2), one 
obtains that: 
1 − 𝜌 = 𝑠 −
1 − (𝜏 + 𝑡)
(𝑝𝜏 + 𝑞𝑡)
 
where the fraction of 𝐷 channeled to borrowing is now 𝑠. Therefore, 1 − 𝜌 − 𝜆 =
[𝛯 − 𝜆(𝑝𝜏 + 𝑞𝑡)] (𝑝𝜏 + 𝑞𝑡)⁄ , where 𝛯 ≡ 𝑠(𝑝𝜏 + 𝑞𝑡) + (𝜏 + 𝑡) − 1. The case of the 
social-welfare minded government is that for which 𝜆 is zero in this expression,10 and 
?́? may be rewritten as follows: 
?́? =
(1 − 2𝑝)[𝛿(𝑝𝜏 + 𝑞𝑡) + 𝛯𝑐′] − 𝛯(1 − 𝑝)ℎ𝑎
𝑝𝛯ℎ𝑎 − 2𝑝[𝛿(𝑝𝜏 + 𝑞𝑡) + 𝛯𝑐′]
     (26) 
It may be easily checked that substituting for 𝛯, a quadratic equation in ?́? comes up, 
implying a nonlinear relationship between ?́? and 𝑡 if ?́? = ?̃? is to be enforced.11 These 
are the results in the absence of personal income taxation whose introduction would 
alleviate the borrowing needs of the social-welfare minded government. Yet, once 
there does exist such a need because, for instance, of personal income tax evasion, 
(26) is expected to hold. In any case, 𝑛 is adjusted accordingly and the result that 
government borrowing lowers lending to the firm and leads thereby the system to an 
equilibrium away from steady-state, has to be qualified in the light of the increase of 
such lending brought about by tax evasion. 
2.4 The Populist Government 
According to Khemraj (2008), market power in bank lending in LDCs, may imply 
that excess liquidity and bank loans become substitutes at a low but still positive loan rate. 
Once, the marginal borrower is unwilling to pay the minimum rate, non-remunerative 
excess liquidity is accumulated by the bank. We have seen that within the context of 
the private sector exclusively, bank market power is not enough to arrive at a perfect 
substitutability between excess liquidity and lending. Neither such an eventuality 
would be to the best interest of a rent-seeking bureaucracy; much more so, of a social-
welfare minded government. Yet, there is a third type of government that has to be 
considered since it has not been rare historically; namely that of the populist rent-
seeking bureaucracy. It is the one that would force the bank to operate under the 
lowest 𝑟, i.e. that desired by the firm, below ?̃?, given (20), which is supposed to 
ensure the optimal unborrowed reserves that the government needs to exploit.  
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Figure 1 
Figure 1 illustrates this case assuming taxation away to keep the diagram as simple as 
possible. 𝐷1 is the demand curve for loans by the firm, which becomes 𝐷2 when the 
demand from the  non-social-welfare maximizing government is added. The supply 
curve of loans is given by 𝑆1while 𝑀𝐸𝐶 is the marginal expenditure curve of the firm. 
The market clearing 𝑟 is 𝑟0, and 𝑟1 and 𝑟2 are the maximum and minimum 𝑟 which 
may be produced by bilateral bargaining with the bank. Unborrowed funds are 𝑈𝑉 
and may be produced either through 𝑟1with given 𝑆 or via 𝑟2 forcing in effect a 
downward shift of 𝑆 to 𝑆2. This, i.e. a loan market “in the hands” of a populist 
bureaucracy, might be an explanation of the emergence of perfect substitutability 
between excess liquidity and bank lending at low rates in LDCs where banks do 
possess market power.12 The liquidity is in excess only seemingly, awaiting to be 
exploited by the populist government. 
The presence of such an excess liquidity might also be taken as a sign of “lazy 
banking” in an environment of political instability encouraging sooner or later the 
emergence of a populist government, and having banks preparing financially 
themselves for this eventuality. As Emran and Farazi (2009, p. 1) note, government 
borrowing in developing economies “may create moral hazard and thus discourage 
the banks from lending to the risky private sector, and stifle their incentives to seek 
out new profitable investment opportunities in the private sector”. And, the evidence 
they find in support of this hypothesis is overwhelming regardless the matter of 
excess liquidity at low interest rate. It is evidence about in general the absence of 
“Ricardian Equivalence” in developing countries. Evidence, which, within the context 
of this paper, implies increased competition by firms to secure lending, discouraging 
them even further to engage in underground activities in an environment of general 
economic decline, ceteris paribus: “[A] $1.00 more borrowing by government 
reduces private credit by about $1.40” (Emran and Farazi 2009, Abstract).13 
3. Concluding Remarks 
To sum up, assuming away dual economy considerations and international trade, a 
one firm-one bank-one laborer model was presented initially, as an abstract 
description of a private-only-sector developing economy. Bank monopoly power was 
found to induce lexicographic preferences towards underground economy income. 
The stability of the system depends on the relative size of the official to total capital 
ratio and the response of loan demand to the interest rate. Next, three types of 
government were introduced into the basic model.  Government and indirect taxation 
do alter the optimal official to total capital ratio. But, the steady-state and stability of 
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the system remain unchanged under a tax financed balanced budget, which is defined 
to be the budget case under a social-welfare minded government. Government 
borrowing by a rent-seeking government or to cope with tax-evasion induced budget 
deficits lowers lending to the firm and leads thereby the system to equilibrium away 
from steady-state; but tax evasion increases such lending towards steady-state 
restoration. The third type of not only rent-seeking but populist too, bureaucracy, 
might be cited as a reason of experiencing perfect substitutability between excess 
liquidity and bank lending at some positive interest rate. 
Dual economy characteristics have been assumed away from the discussion at no real-
world relevance cost as the long standing critique against this approach appears to 
suggest (see e.g. Ghatak 1978). There does exist enormous heterogeneity of rates of 
return to the same factor of production within a single economy − see e.g. Banerjee 
and Duflo (2005) − so that a two at least sector economy might be contemplated. 
And, this paper too, follows the general trend by aggregate growth theory to disregard 
this reality. But, it is a paper based on a microeconomic feature of developing 
economies, namely that of a more or less bilateral monopsony in the loan market, 
linking at the same time this market with the presence of and the need to mobilize 
resources and capabilities that are hidden.  The mentality underlying such an approach 
abides by Hirschman’s (1965) view of development rather than macroeconomic 
growth. What is important for this paper methodologically is that macroeconomic 
dynamics should originate in the initial conditions shaped by so to speak “less 
aggregate” stylized facts, considering the overall economy as whole and not 
compartmentally.  
An evaluation of the real-world relevance of the results should logically follow, but 
money financed budgets and the international factor play a major role in LDCs and 
both of these factors have been assumed away, too. To address the money issue, note 
that under a social-welfare minded government, seigniorage issuance would just 
lubricate “the machine”. Money neutrality and superneutrality is expected to be the 
case in the absence of tax evasion. And, money issuance instead of government 
borrowing might be chosen to fill the tax gap in case of tax compliance problems, 
with the only effect being an overall system operating at a higher rate of inflation, 
ceteris paribus.  
But, under any type of rent-seeking government, seigniorage issuance would 
constitute an additional source of income for the bureaucracy. A “restrained” 
bureaucracy will certainly choose less intervention in the private credit market; that is, 
less government borrowing, lessening subsequently the adverse effects of it on the 
steady state and its stability. Only, the inflation rate would be higher than under the 
social-welfare minded government. The inflation might easily get out of control, 
burdening further the stability problem of a system whose steady state is under stress 
from government borrowing and tax evasion, if bureaucracy chooses to be 
“extravagant”; much more so if government borrowing induces a “lazy bank” 
mentality.  
In any case, IMF (2005) points out that over the last few decades, macroeconomic 
stability concerns have reduced significantly the reliance of governments in 
developing countries on inflation tax. Could borrowing from abroad have made any 
difference if of course issuance of sovereign debt in international markets or loan 
acquisition from foreign private banks were possible in practice?14 The answer would 
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be in the affirmative if borrowed funds were channeled to public investment even if 
the risks of sovereign finance were small; otherwise, such borrowing is expected 
sooner or later to be recessionary regardless type of bureaucracy. And, the risks of 
sovereign finance have been such that to have induced in recent years, several 
developing countries to adopt aggressive policies aiming at retiring public external 
debt and substituting it with domestically issued debt (see e.g. Panizza 2008). 
International trade and foreign direct investment do encourage a priori the overall 
economy and favor the official one. But, the experience of developing countries with 
the international sector has been one of “anarchy”, making in practice impossible to 
handle borrowing from abroad efficiently even if the government is a social-welfare 
minded one. According to Baunsgaard and Keen (2005), the recent trade liberalization 
has resulted in a significant loss of tariffs, which has not been possible to recover 
through the introduction of value added taxation. And, the profit shifting by 
multinationals out of many developing countries and into tax havens has been so 
massive that has alarmed the international community altogether,...UNCTAD, Oxfam, 
Eurodad, IF Campaign, Christian Aid, International Bar Association,... (see e.g. 
Forstater 2012).  
It is under such in general circumstances, circumstances of weak institutions and 
limited law enforcement as Singh, Jain-Chandra, and Mohommad (2012) would 
emphasize, and circumstances of neocolonialism one might add that the predictive 
power of the model presented earlier should be evaluated... 
Footnotes 
1 These are actually economies where not only poverty but also low economic, 
institutional, and human resources prevail. The complete list of them as approved by 
the UN General Assembly in 1971 has as follows: In South Asia: Afghanistan, 
Bangladesh, Bhutan, and Nepal. South-East Asia: Cambodia Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic, and Myanmar. In South-West Asia: Yemen. In South Pacific: 
Kiribati, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Timor Leste, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu. In Sub-Saharan 
Africa: Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, 
Comoros, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, 
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, 
Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, 
Somalia, Sudan, Togo, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, and Zambia. And, 
finally, Haiti in the Americas. These are all countries which moreover have to cope 
with geophysical challenges. 
2 Nowhere in the literature of the causes of underground economy (see e.g. Schneider 
and Enste 2000) is to be found the idea presented herein that this economy may be 
also the result of moral hazard, hidden information, on the part of borrowing firms. 
Standard debt contracts are inefficient in fostering incentive compatibility if the firm 
and the bank are not both risk neutral (see e.g. Freixas and Rochet 2008), and the real 
world is not one of “mutual” risk neutrality. 
3 This is a “heroic” assumption, but is made only to conform to the evidence; 
analytically, it is unnecessary. 
4 It is also a Piccione-Rubinstein (2007) jungle economy scenario and hence, the 
optima found below should be assessed in this connection too, as is done later herein. 
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5 From a list of 162 countries only 9 of them were found with an underground 
economy exceeding the official one between 1999 and 2007: Azerbaijan, Georgia, 
Guatemala, Haiti, Nigeria, Panama, Tanzania, Uruguay, and Zimbabwe. Nevertheless, 
the trend over time is declining. 
6 Also, according to Houba Luttens, and Weikard (2014), in a farsighted (rather than 
myopic) jungle, the equilibrium is not a jungle, a coercive one, but coincides with 
lexicographic welfare maximization. Only myopia can prompt non-lexicographic, 
jungle equilibria in a jungle. 
7 If 𝑌 is only taxed, just replace 𝛽𝛾 in (14) and (14′) by 𝕥𝛽𝛾; and if 𝑉 is taxed too, 
replace 𝜗𝜇 in these expressions by 𝕥𝜗𝜇 as well. The result that 𝜇 = 0 does not change. 
This is in accordance with the proposition that in a farsighted jungle economy, initial 
holdings are irrelevant for lexicographic welfare maximization (see e.g. Houba 
Luttens, and Weikard 2013). 
8 As Rötheli (2012) shows in a dynamic context, rational and bounded rational default 
expectations under concentrated banking can even aggravate cyclical trends. 
9 The credit rationing implied by government borrowing is lessened in the presence of 
tax evasion, but continues to exist. The point is that contrary to what Dabla-Norris and 
Feltenstein (2003), for example, suggest, credit rationing is not the result of tax 
evasion once the bank is taxed, too. 
10 In any case, both 𝜏 and 𝑡 enter both the numerator and denominator of ?́? and ?́?. 
Letting 𝛬 ≡ 𝑝𝜏 + 𝑞𝑡, ?́? and ?́? become:  
?́? =
2𝑎{𝛿(𝛯 − 𝜆𝛬)2[𝛿𝛬 − (𝛯 − 𝜆𝛬)𝑐′]2 + 𝛬4𝑐′2}2
𝑏{𝑞𝑚𝑡[𝛿𝛬 + (𝛯 − 𝜆𝛬)𝑐′]}2(𝛯 − 𝜆𝛬)4𝑃2
 
and 
?́? =
2(𝛯 − 𝜆𝛬){{𝛿(𝛯 − 𝜆𝛬)2[𝛿𝛬 + (𝛯 − 𝜆𝛬)𝑐′]}2 + 𝛬4𝑐′2}2
𝑏[𝛿𝛬 + (𝛯 − 𝜆𝛬)𝑐′][𝑞𝑚𝑡(𝛯 − 𝜆𝛬)4]2𝑃3
 
The qualitative result that 𝛷 and 𝛹 decrease in 𝜏 and 𝑡 remains and imposes 
restrictions on parameter values, which are of no concern here. 
11 The quadratic equation is: ?́?2𝜔1 + ?́?𝜔2 + 𝜔3 = 0, where 𝜔1 ≡ {𝑝[ℎ𝑎(1 + 𝑠𝑝)] −
𝑐′(1 + 𝑠𝑝) − 2𝛿𝑝2}, 𝜔2 ≡ {𝑡[(𝑝ℎ𝑎 − 𝑐′)(1 + 𝑠𝑞) − 2𝛿𝑝𝑞] + ℎ𝑎(1 − 𝑝)(1 + 𝑠𝑝) −
(1 − 2𝑝)[𝛿𝑝 + 𝑐′(1 + 𝑠𝑝)] − (𝑝ℎ𝑎 + 𝑐′)}, and 𝜔3 ≡ {𝑡{(1 + 𝑠𝑞)[ℎ𝑎(1 − 𝑝) −
(1 − 2𝑝)𝑐′] − (1 − 2𝑝)𝛿𝑎} + (1 − 2𝑝)𝑐′ − ℎ𝑎(1 − 𝑝)}. 
12 Does this mean from Khemraj’s (2008) evidence about such substitutability in 6 
countries (between roughly 1999 and 2007) that these countries had populist 
governments or political instability leading to populism? These countries are Guyana, 
Namibia, Tanzania, Trinidad & Tobago, Uganda, and Zambia. And, a simple search 
for their history in Wikipedia suffices to show that all of them have been subject to 
great instability, indeed. 
13 Equally broader as the issue of lazy banking is the matter of public sector 
corruption in connection with the rent-seeking bureaucracy, and of private sector 
corruption in connection with tax compliance. Is such a bureaucracy corrupt? If rent-
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seeking signifies corruption, the answer will be in the affirmative. The same “goes” 
for the private sector. But, corruption has many facets which should not bother us here 
in order to avoid the temptation linking it such issues as political and/or market 
competition (see e.g. Montinola and Jackman 2002), efficiency-enhancing, (see e.g. 
Barreto 2001, and Ahmad, Ullah, and Arfeen 2012), etc. For us, here, any government 
can be democratic or dictatorial, bank market concentration may become the source of 
public sector “corruption” ex hypothesi,such corruption is found to be hampering 
efficiency whereas private sector “corruption” is found to be improving it... 
14 The access of developing countries to international financial markets should not be 
taken for granted. As Gelos, Sahay, and Sandleris (2004, p. 3) indicate, questions like 
the following all matter: “At what development stage can low-income countries 
expect to be able to tap the international capital markets? Which characteristics 
differentiate those countries that are able to borrow regularly from those that are only 
occasionally or never able to do so? To which extent do government policies matter 
for capital market access?” 
Acknowledgement: I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for useful comments 
and suggestions; any remaining errors or omissions are my own. 
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